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Dark patterns in online data gathering infringe on 
citizens' right to privacy and create a profound 
imbalance of power between citizens of digitalizing 
societies and institutional actors. In effect, even when 
users declare their concern about privacy, this attitude 
is often not reflected in actions. In the study reported 
here we found that Facebook users indeed perceive an 
imbalance of control over privacy: they feel it is their 
responsibility to protect it but at the same time they 
feel that they are less capable to fulfil this task than 
institutional actors. We also found that privacy 
concerns were a good predictor of actual effects of 
privacy protective behaviors, while at the same time 
they did not correlate with declarations about privacy 
protection, which suggest a need for careful 
measurement of such constructs. Our results are a first 
step towards a comprehensive research agenda on 
individuals’ attitudes towards institutional privacy.   
1. Introduction  
Digitalization of social interactions inevitably leads 
to production of data. By accessing digital services, 
individuals satisfy a plethora of needs but at the same 
time leave a trail of data that describe them and their 
relations. These data are then aggregated, cross-linked 
and analyzed by private and public sector actors to 
develop personalized products and services [1]. By 
shaping and creating individual needs, such products 
and services often incentivize individuals to share more 
data [2], thus creating an imbalance of control over 
data between citizens and institutional actors. 
Individuals are the main suppliers of data and at the 
same time draw little value from the data they supply. 
Moreover, they might face deleterious consequences of 
extensive data sharing when the data are used to 
manipulate their opinions and attitudes, leading them 
to suboptimal choices or decisions [1]. Such decisions, 
when aggregated over many individuals, may also have 
society-wide consequences. Manipulation of public 
opinions can lead to polarization in societies [3] and if 
it is carried out by actors with an agenda it can 
determine the political course of a whole nation [4] or 
undermine public health [5]. 
Such negative consequences are an effect of 
violations of “institutional privacy” understood as 
privacy from institutional [6] or economic surveillance 
[7]. However, individuals are often more apprehensive 
about “social privacy”, i.e. sharing personal 
information with other individuals [6]. Studies 
investigating such social sharing have shown a 
discrepancy between declared concerns for privacy and 
the actions that contradict these concerns, i.e. the 
privacy paradox [8]. For example, people declaring 
privacy concerns in a survey were nevertheless willing 
to answer sensitive questions when subsequently 
interviewed by an anthropomorphic shopping agent 
[9]. Social media users professing concerns over 
strangers finding out their sensitive information (such 
as sexual orientation or partners’ names) did in fact 
reveal such facts on their social media profiles [10]. 
The privacy calculus model aims at explaining this 
paradox by positing that in each interaction with digital 
services, individuals assess the risks and opportunities 
involved in sharing their data [11] and value 
convenience over privacy. For example, future 
consequences of privacy breaching disclosures are 
discounted compared to immediate gratification which 
might be given for such behavior [12].   
Moreover, whilst digital service users are mostly 
aware that private companies gather their personal data 
for economic purposes, many still do not acknowledge 
the scope of this process [2] or the potential power that 
abusing individuals’ institutional privacy provides 
[13]. Often, they are unaware of the ways their data are 
aggregated and used by platform operators [14] or 
confuse social privacy protection (i.e. availability of 
privacy options within platforms which limit visibility 
of personal information to specific others) with 
institutional privacy protection [6, 15]. Out of those 
who realize the scope of surveillance, many display 
“resigned pragmatism”: helplessness in face of their 
limited capacities to keep their data private [16]. We 





posit that this lack of awareness, concern or 
capabilities to understand the scope and consequences 
of abuse of institutional privacy is precisely what 
increases the imbalances of power between individuals 
and institutions, limiting citizens’ right to privacy. 
The status quo in institutional privacy protection is 
in line with particular interests of platform operators, 
who may actively increase the cost of privacy in the 
privacy calculus. For example, the prevalent solution to 
tackling privacy issues by service providers are privacy 
options and privacy policies that evolve to fulfil the 
minimal requirements imposed by local or global 
regulators (e.g. European GDPR policy). Yet, within 
the regulatory boundaries, platform operators can still 
make it hard for individuals to protect their privacy 
[15]. Often, by implementing privacy features they 
move the burden of protecting privacy from themselves 
to end users. Moreover, by creating an additional 
burden (e.g. the cost of finding privacy features or 
understanding privacy policies), such functionalities 
drain users’ cognitive resources and reduce motivation, 
leading to cynicism or apathy [16]. For other users 
such practices can also create an illusion of agency and 
thus promote more data sharing [8], increasing the 
platform operators’ advantage in data control. 
The resultant imbalances in power over the main 
resource of the digital age – data – threatens to spur a 
self-reinforcing growth of societal inequalities: not 
only in economic terms but also in social and political 
rights [17, 18]. Thus, the wellbeing of citizens and the 
future of democratic societies depends on 
understanding how such imbalances can be mitigated. 
For this, a comprehensive research agenda that would 
investigate individuals’ approach towards institutional 
privacy, as well as possible mitigating strategies, is 
needed. The study presented here is a step towards a 
better understanding on how individuals perceive the 
imbalance of power and agency, on how they can 
regain agency in privacy related behavior and, 
specifically, how they can be helped in shielding their 
privacy against institutional surveillance. Here, we 
focus on three aspects of privacy attitudes: a) the 
relation between privacy concerns and behaviors 
protecting institutional privacy; b) responsibilities and 
agency in institutional privacy protection of individuals 
and other actors; and c) risks and opportunities related 
to data gathering for various actors. 
1.1. Research questions 
Research on privacy paradox and privacy calculus 
suggest that users’ declarations about privacy 
importance do not correspond to their actions, i.e. 
attitudes and behavior do not match, possibly due to 
lower importance of privacy than of convenience [11]. 
Although much research has been carried out to 
unpack the relation between privacy attitude and 
privacy behavior the results are inconsistent [19]. 
Many studies on the privacy paradox do not measure 
actual behaviors or their indicators, but declarations or 
intentions [19], or do not differentiate between social 
and institutional privacy [15]. As such, the relation 
between attitudes to privacy and behaviors protecting 
institutional privacy is largely unknown. Here we 
wanted to find out whether  privacy concerns can 
predict a long term, institutional privacy protecting 
behavior across interactions with multiple  business 
actors. Thus we posed the following research question: 
RQ 1. Are higher concerns for privacy related to 
better data protection from institutional actors? 
The discovery of the gap between privacy attitudes 
and behavior of digital media users has contributed to 
the rise of “privacy-by-design” trend in digital 
services: solutions that proactively integrate privacy 
protecting principles into system’s design [20]. This 
approach draws from empirical results on privacy 
protecting behavior which show that, e.g. priming 
privacy related issues increases chances of privacy 
protecting behaviors [21] or that changing the privacy 
calculus leads to better privacy choices [22]. This 
approach attempts at shifting the burden of privacy 
protection from individuals to platform designers. 
However, it is unclear how users perceive the 
responsibilities related with privacy protection: as a 
burden or as personal agency. Thus we asked: 
RQ 2a. According to digital media users, what is 
the responsibility of individuals vs. institutional actors 
in protecting privacy? 
RQ 2b. According to digital media users, what is 
the perceived agency of individuals vs. institutional 
actors in protecting privacy? 
Finally, as indicated by results of privacy-by-design 
solutions, raising individuals’ awareness of the scope 
of data gathering and data use by institutional actors 
may increase their agency in privacy protection [21]. 
This might be especially true if individuals were 
previously unaware how much data are gathered and 
how that data are used [23]. However, even users that 
are aware of abuses of institutional privacy may lack in 
motivation due to the experience of resignation and 
helplessness [16]. Thus, the effects of raising 
awareness on privacy protecting behaviors may depend 
on what are their initial perceptions of risks and 
opportunities involved in data gathering and how 
accurate is their initial awareness of the scope and 
effects of data gathering. 
RQ 3a. How do digital media users perceive the 
risks and opportunities of data gathering practices? 
Page 2723
RQ 3b. Does increasing individuals’ awareness of 
data gathering practices of institutional actors change 
their perception of data gathering practices? 
To answer these research questions we designed a 
study investigating privacy related attitudes, behaviors 
and practices of Facebook users in Poland. The study 
procedure included an additional exercise to help users 
find and manage what data Facebook gathers about 
them and at the same time allowed us to test the effect 
of raising awareness of data gathering practices on 
individuals’ attitudes towards privacy protection. 
2. Materials and methods  
An online questionnaire was launched on the 
LimeSurvey platform. A post informing about the 
study with a link to the questionnaire was promoted on 
Facebook for nine days among adult Facebook users 
living in Poland and speaking Polish. The ad was 
visible only to users who logged in to Facebook on a 
computer. The study was not advertised to Facebook 
users logged in with their mobile devices because of 
the additional difficulties these users could face when 
switching between the Facebook app where users were 
to check their privacy settings and the questionnaire 
where they were to report their findings. Such 
differences in task difficulty could introduce 
uncontrolled bias in the sample.  
To incentivize participation in the study we offered 
two gift vouchers to randomly chosen participants who 
would finish the main questionnaire and additional two 
vouchers to participants who would complete the 
additional task about their Facebook privacy settings. 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants. 
All procedures were approved by an Ethics Committee. 
The questionnaire was composed of six sections 
measuring different aspects of privacy and 
management of online data: 1) privacy attitude and 
behavior, 2) attitude towards data acquisition by social 
media platforms, 3) General Data Protection 
Regulation, 4) privacy concerns, 5) social media 
habits, and 6) demographic questions. The participants 
who completed at least the third section of the 
questionnaire were invited to take part in an additional 
part of the questionnaire requiring inspection of 
Facebook privacy settings.   
Privacy attitude was assessed by two questions: 
How important is it to you to protect privacy during 
offline activities? and How important is it to you to 
protect privacy in the online world? We assessed 
privacy behavior by two questions: How often do you 
speak about privacy with your friends? and How often 
do you adjust privacy settings on social platforms? 
Additionally, in this part of the questionnaire we asked  
to what extent different actors (e.g. users of social 
media, social media operators, governments, NGOs, 
and similar) should be obliged to take care of the 
privacy of digital media users; and to assess the 
chances of these actors to enforce protection of privacy 
for digital media users. Respondents were asked to 
provide answers to the above questions on the scale 
from 1 to 5 (1 indicating not at all/never/very low to 5 
indicating very much/very often/very high).  
Attitude towards data acquisition by social media 
operators was assessed by following questions: How 
beneficial is the acquisition of data by social media 
platforms to you/underage digital media users/senior 
media users/society as a whole/businesses/platform 
operators?; To what extent data acquisition by social 
media platforms has negative consequences for 
you/underage digital media users/senior media 
users/society as a whole/businesses/platform 
operators?; To what extent the accumulation of data 
about digital media users by social media platforms 
should be limited?; What do companies managing 
social media such as Facebook know about you?; How 
often do you happen to wonder before the publication 
of content on social media whether a post contains too 
much private content? Respondents were asked to 
mark their answers to the above questions on the scale 
from 1 to 5 (1 indicating not at all/nothing/never to 5 
indicating very much/everything/very often). 
Additionally, we asked here to what extent the access 
to data regarding digital media users’ activity should 
be changed for governments and private business 
owners. Answers were provided on a five-point scale 
(1 indicating “it should be reduced”, 5 indicating ”it 
should be significantly increased”).   
The attitude towards General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) was measured by four questions: 
To what extent do you agree that GDRP has reduced 
the possibility of acquiring data on social media users 
by owners of social media platforms?; To what extent 
do you agree that you regained control over your data 
thanks to the GDRP?; To what extent do you agree that 
GDPR regulates the possibility of acquiring data on 
social media users effectively enough?, How irritated 
do you feel when having to make a decision regarding 
the privacy settings each time you enter a new 
webpage? The answers were given on a scale from 1 to 
5 (1 indicating not at all and 5 indicating very much). 
Privacy concerns were measured by the Internet 
Privacy Concerns scale (IPC) [24]. The IPC scale is 
composed of 26  questions. To minimize the effect of 
earlier questions on the later answers (by asking 
privacy related questions we might have increased 
privacy awareness) we rotated the order of the 
questions in the IPC questionnaire and the position of 
the IPC questionnaire in the whole survey.    
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To measure social media habits we asked 
respondents how often they use different social media 
such as Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Reddit or 
Twitter and at what age they had set up their profile on 
Facebook. 
The demographics section of the questionnaire 
consisted of questions about age, gender, education 
level and size of the place of residence. 
The additional part of the questionnaire - the 
Facebook privacy settings exercise - was composed of 
two tasks, each followed by a few questions. In the 
first task, each respondent was asked to log into her/his 
Facebook account and investigate how many 
companies deliver data to Facebook about the 
respondent’s activity outside of Facebook To extract 
this information respondents had to, first, go to privacy 
settings, choose “Your information on Facebook”, then 
“View or delete information about activity outside 
Facebook”, and then click on “Activity outside 
Facebook”. The list of companies provided there is 
password protected, therefore even logged in 
respondents had to enter their password and only then 
they could choose “Activity outside Facebook” again 
to see the list. This procedure was quite long and 
seemed to be complicated, therefore, we prepared 
detailed screenshots of what to do step by step. We 
asked respondents five questions related to this task: 
whether they managed to reach the information, what 
was the number of companies that transferred data on 
respondent's activities outside of Facebook to 
Facebook, whether they have been aware that other 
companies share such data with Facebook, how 
surprised they were by the amount of information that 
Facebook gathers about them, and to describe their 
reaction after seeing the list. 
In the second task, we asked respondents to 
investigate the categories that Facebook assigned to 
them based on their activity. A detailed instruction 
with screenshots was presented. Respondents were 
asked to go to their privacy settings, choose “Privacy-
shortcuts”, go to “Advertising preferences”, “Choose 
your advertising settings”, “Categories used to reach 
you”, and finally “Categories of interests”. The 
description of the task was followed by eight questions. 
First we asked respondents whether they managed to 
reach the categories of interests that Facebook assigned 
to them, and if not - why. Those who managed to 
complete the task were asked to report the number of 
categories they found (a categorical variable, since 
Facebook does not provide the precise number), to 
assess how well the categories assigned by Facebook 
described them, to assess whether privacy management 
on Facebook was easy, whether they had known how 
to access privacy settings prior to the study and 
whether they were aware that they could reduce the 
accumulation of data about their activity by social 
media by these settings. Additionally, to check whether 
the conducted tasks influenced their attitude towards 
data acquisition by social media we repeated here two 
questions from the second section of the questionnaire: 
To what extent the accumulation of data about digital 
media users by social media platforms should be 
limited? What do companies managing social media 
such as Facebook know about you? 
3. Results  
3.1. Respondents 
Online studies often suffer from a  high attrition 
rate and our study was no exception: only 61% of 
respondents completed the whole survey. In order not 
to lose the answers of those who did not complete the 
whole survey (i.e. not to increase the self-selection 
bias) or those who did not provide answers to specific 
questions (some were not obligatory) we decided to 
use all the valid cases. In result, different analyses were 
run on different numbers of cases (yielding different 
Ns and dfs reported in the results). 
Eighty nine out of 145 persons who agreed to take 
part in the study completed it in full. Four participants 
who declared to be under 18 years old were excluded 
from the analyses. Out of the respondents who 
completed the demographic questions 45 (53%) were 
women; the respondents’ age varied from 18 to 87 
years old (M = 41.82, SD = 18.48). The majority of 
participants lived in a big city (65%); 21% lived in a 
small city and the rest in a village. Half of the 
participants (54%) had completed higher education 
while 35% finished secondary school. 
The respondents were frequent users of Facebook 
(M = 4.65, SD = .629 on a scale from 1 to 5) and 
occasional users of  Instagram (M = 2.22, SD = 1.53). 
The least used social media in the studied sample were 
Twitter (M = 1.68, SD = 1.11), TikTok (M = 1.40, SD 
= 1), and Reddit (M = 1.26, SD = .74), which did not 
come as a surprise because the information about the 
study was promoted only on Facebook. The majority of 
respondents (67%) created an account on Facebook as 
adults, 27% did it as teenagers and only 6% as 
children.  
3.2. Privacy attitude and behavior 
First we analyzed whether our respondents 
displayed the privacy paradox. In the first analysis we 
determined if there was a difference in the need for 
privacy between offline and online activity. A 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that of the 120 
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participants who answered both questions, 18 
participants assessed privacy in offline activities as 
more important than on the internet, only 9 were of 
opposite opinion. The rest did not exhibit any 
differences in evaluation of the need for privacy 
protection in offline and online activities, z = 111.5, p 
= .048. 
Next, we analyzed the distributions of privacy 
attitudes. These were generally skewed: the 
distributions of answers to both questions about 
privacy importance as well as of the scores on the IPC 
scale indicated that most participants valued their 
privacy highly. This might be an effect of the sample 
gathering method – possibly, only those concerned 
with privacy agreed to fill in the survey. However, this 
result might also be due to the privacy paradox: the 
attitude of high concern for privacy might be 
considered socially desirable but might not translate 
into behaviors.  
To verify this we tested for correlations between 
attitudes and behaviors. There was a statistically 
significant positive correlation between the two 
measures of privacy attitudes: importance of privacy 
protection online and in offline activities,  τb = .71, p < 
.0005 and between the importance of offline, and 
online privacy and the IPC scale score (τb(94) = .24, p 
= .004, τb(94) = .22, p = .009). However, none but one 
of these measures correlated significantly with the 
propensity to talk about privacy or to change privacy 
settings on Facebook, p > .05, confirming the privacy 
paradox. The propensity to talk about privacy 
correlated with attitude toward online privacy ( τb(120) 
= .18, p = .02). These two behavior related questions 
yield significantly correlated answers ( τb(120) = .22, p 
= .004).  
As explained in the introduction, such paradox 
might not preclude a positive relation between privacy 
attitude and privacy protecting behaviors. To answer 
RQ1 – whether individuals’ attitudes towards privacy 
impact their behavior online and its effects in terms of 
data traces left – we checked whether privacy attitudes 
could predict how much data about activities outside 
Facebook our respondents allowed the social media 
company to gather. The respondents reported this after 
being guided to access it in the Facebook privacy 
settings: they were asked to report how many 
companies sent data on the respondents’ to Facebook. 
Amongst others, Facebook can gather users’ 
activities on other websites when they allow it to leave 
a third-party cookie, or use the Facebook login, share 
or like buttons within their services. To limit this data 
gathering users have to meticulously decline cookies, 
clean their cookie cache regularly and, if advanced, use 
dedicated websites that limit data flows between data 
collectors (e.g. youradchoices.com). Finally, they have 
the option to block Facebook from using such data for 
ad personalization by accessing their privacy options 
on the platform. All these actions require substantial 
effort on part of the users. Thus, we concluded that the 
number of companies that sent data to Facebook about 
a particular user might be an estimate of how much the 
user is engaged in privacy protecting behavior online. 
For our predictor variable we chose the IPC score, 
as the other measures of privacy attitude were on scales 
with smaller range and thus had lower variance. The 
response variable was approximately log-linearly 
distributed; therefore we used its log transform in the 
model. The model was statistically significant and 
explained 31% of the variance in the number of 
companies sharing data on the user (F(1,40) = 17.6, p 
< .001): the higher the IPC score the less companies 
were reported as sending data about the user to 




Fig. 1. Relationship between IPC score and the 
number of companies providing Facebook with data on 
users; line corresponds to predicted values, and the 
greyed area to 95% CI. 
3.3. Privacy protection: responsibility and 
agency  
To answer RQ2 - who should be responsible for 
protecting the privacy of online users and who has the 
highest chances of changing existing standards that 
enable privacy violation - we run a series of Friedman  
tests. First, we examined which actors the respondents 
felt should be most obliged to take care of the privacy 
of digital media users. Pairwise comparisons were 
performed with a Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons. Perception of obligation was statistically 
significantly different between different actors, χ2(3) = 
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43.17, p < .001. Post hoc analysis revealed statistically 
significant differences in perception of responsibility 
between NGOs (Mdn = 2.15) and users (Mdn = 2.70) 
(p = .006); NGOs and social media platforms (Mdn = 
2.83) (p < .001); government (Mdn = 2.33) and social 
media platforms (p = .016); but not between NGOs and 
government, government and users, nor between users 
and social media platforms.  
There are two interesting takeaways from this 
analysis: users assign themselves the same level of 
responsibility for protecting privacy as to social media 
platforms, and the government is not perceived as 
responsible for ensuring the users’ privacy to the same 
degree as social media platforms are. Although it is the 
government that has the legislative power to implement 
regulations, users seem not to expect the government to 
act on it. This attitude towards regulators and their 
effectiveness in curbing the imbalances in control of 
data might stem from the fact that when asked about 
the effectiveness of broad data regulatory acts (here: 
the GDPR) our respondents assessed them rather 
negatively. On average, they did not agree with a 
statements that GDPR limited the practice of 
accumulating data by social media platforms (M = 
2.19, SD = 1.21), that GDPR regulates the practice of 
collecting data by social media platforms effectively 
enough (M = 1.96, SD = 1.01), nor did they feel that 
they regained control over their data (M = 1.99, SD = 
1.12). Moreover, on average, respondents felt slightly 
irritated by the need to control privacy settings each 
time they entered a new site (M = 3.31, SD = 1.4). The 
assessment of the GDPR was available only to the 
respondents who were familiar with the regulation, but 
only one respondent declared that they did not know 
what GDPR was. 
Second, a Friedman test was run to determine if 
there were differences in perception of agency in 
protecting privacy between different actors (RQ2b).  
Pairwise comparisons were performed with a 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. 
Perception of agency was statistically significantly 
different between actors, χ2(3) = 44.04, p < .001. Post 
hoc analysis revealed statistically significant 
differences in perception of agency between social 
media platforms (Mdn = 3.01) and government (Mdn = 
2.56) (p = .039), social media platforms and users 
themselves (Mdn = 2.15) (p < .001), and social media 
platforms and NGOs (Mdn = 2.28) (p < .001), but not 
between users and government, users and NGOs, nor 
between NGOs and government. Social media 
platforms are perceived as the most capable actor in 
changing the existing standards in data collection 
practice. The users themselves, governments and 
NGOs are assessed as less powerful actors in this 
system. 
3.4. Risks and opportunities of massive data 
collection  
To answer RQ3a on individuals’ perceptions of 
risks and opportunities of data gathering we analyzed 
answers to questions about negative and positive 
consequences of data gathering for various actors: the 
users themselves, underage digital media users, senior 
media users, society as a whole as well as businesses 
and platform operators. By performing a principal 
component analysis (PCA) on the question about 
benefits we found that media users divide the 
beneficiaries of data gathering into two groups: the 
first consists of business and platform operators (i.e. 
the private sector) and the second of all other actors. 
The overall Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) measure was 
0.74, with individual KMO measures not lower than 
0.5. Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was statistically 
significant (p < .0005), indicating that the data was 
factorizable. The two revealed  components had 
eigenvalues greater than one and explained 47.33%, 
25.35% of the total variance, respectively. A Varimax 
orthogonal rotation was employed. 
We obtained the same division of actors: private 
business (business and social media platforms) and 
society (e.g., elderly, minors, the respondent herself, 
society as whole) after running a PCA on assessment 
of risks related to gathering of data by social media 
platforms. The overall Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) 
measure was 0.78, with individual KMO measures not 
lower than 0.5. Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was 
significant (p < .0005). The two components had 
eigenvalues greater than one and explained 56.96%, 
21.32% of the total variance, respectively. A Varimax 
orthogonal rotation was employed.  
We then compared these two groups of actors as 
determined by the PCA with regard to how their 
benefits and risks from data gathering were perceived 
by respondents. We found that businesses accrue 
higher benefits and positive consequences than 
negative consequences and risks: on a scale from 1 
(“there are no benefits”/“there are no risks”) to 5 
(“there are great benefits”/“there are great risks”) their 
benefits were assessed at 4.16 on average (SD = .09) 
while their negative consequences at 2.41 on average 
(SD = .18), F(1,108) = 101.96, p < .0001. On the other 
hand the non-business users of social media get 
significantly less benefits from data gathering (M = 
1.99, SD = .09) than negative consequences (M = 3.9, 
SD = .1), F(1,108) = 171.82, p < .0001. 
To better understand the consequences of these 
perceptions of data gathering we also analyzed 
questions that tackled the effects of this process: 
whether the respondents thought that data gatherers (in 
our case Facebook) knew them well (from 1 - “they 
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don’t know anything about me” to 5 - “they know 
everything about me”) and whether they thought that 
data gathering should be limited (from 1 - “it shouldn’t 
be limited at all” to 5 - “it should be strongly limited”). 
We found that answers to both questions reflected the 
perception of negative consequences of data gathering: 
the respondents assessed that platform owners knew 
them well (M = 3.79, SD = 1.13) and that data 
gathering should be limited (M = 3.9, SD = 1.13). 
We also explored if the preference for limited data 
gathering depended on respondents’ privacy attitudes 
and the perceived negative consequences for social 
actors (the respondents themselves, minors, senior 
media users and society as a whole) as identified by the 
PCA analysis. The two predictors together explained 
21% of the variance (Table 1) in preference for limited 
data gathering (F(2,91) = 12.7, p < .001).  
 










Perceived negative consequences 





Note: Linear regression coefficients; *** p < .001; 
** p < .005 
 
Finally, to answer RQ3b – whether increased 
awareness of data gathering practices changes digital 
media users’ perceptions of such practices – we 
analyzed answers to a repeated question on preference 
to limit data gathering for those respondents who 
completed the Facebook task that required them to 
access their privacy options on Facebook and to report 
how much data Facebook gathered on them. We found 
that users increased their preference for limited data 
gathering after completing the Facebook task to an 
average of 4.25 (SD = .85), but the difference was not 
statistically significant (p > .05). This result might be 
due to the already high initial negative perception of 
data gathering by digital media platforms that our 
respondents displayed at the beginning of the survey.  
We then analyzed whether they were surprised by 
the number of companies that sent data about them to 
Facebook and found that they were indeed astonished 
by the information Facebook accessed (M = 3.48, SD = 
1.57 on a scale from 1 to 5). Moreover, most (75%) 
were not aware that other companies transferred data 
on their users to Facebook. 
We also qualitatively analyzed the answers to an 
open question “What was your reaction when you saw 
how many companies send data on you to Facebook?”. 
We received 53 answers to this question, mainly 
expressing a range of negative emotions. 
Only 8 respondents (13%) expressed acceptance or 
declared that they did not care how much data from 
other companies is being sent to Facebook. Similarly, 9 
out of 53 (17%) wrote that they were aware of the 
amount of data as well as the companies that send data 
to Facebook and that is why they used specific privacy 
settings to restrict access to their data. In case of those 
respondents, the reaction was calm as they either made 
sure earlier that no information was shared or they 
were fully conscious of the amount of sharing going 
on. These were usually people declaring that they 
actively use the privacy setting option, Facebook 
container or ToR to make sure they have control over 
their data privacy.  
Most reported reactions to the information about 
the number of companies sharing respondent’s data 
with Facebook were shock (32%) and anger (21%). 
Some respondents wrote that they felt cheated or used 
and had no idea about the amount of data Facebook 
acquires outside its platform. Others remarked that 
they thought collecting data in this way was unethical 
and that they were disgusted that some trusted 
institutions or companies had sent their data to 
Facebook. The other responses expressed feelings such 
as surprise (13%) and in three cases respondents 
openly declared fear as their dominant reaction. 
Finally, we analyzed how the perception of what 
platform operators knew about them changed after the 
respondents completed the Facebook task. We found 
that there was no significant difference between the 
assessments before and after the task (p > .05). 
However, we found that those users who perceived the 
categories (which Facebook assigned to them based on 
gathered data) to fit them well, were also more likely to 
assess platform operators' knowledge about them as 
high in the second assessment (τb = .34, p < .005).  
4. Summary of results  
We planned the study reported above as a first step 
towards a comprehensive research agenda to better 
understand digital media users’ awareness and attitudes 
towards institutional privacy and the imbalances of 
power over data between citizens and institutional 
actors. We were prompted by inconsistency in results 
and explanations of the privacy paradox as well as 
limited research specifically on abuses of institutional 
privacy [19]: their perception by and impacts on 
citizens of digitalizing societies.  
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Our study confirmed the existence of the privacy 
paradox among Polish Facebook users. Collected data 
allowed us to investigate the reasons behind this 
discrepancy and check if it stems from the fact that 
users do not value their online privacy enough to put in 
effort to guard it, or if they have a sense of protection 
or anonymity in their online activities and therefore do 
not feel the need to intervene. As our study proved, 
people value their privacy, and they are often not 
comfortable with how data is aggregated and 
commodified behind their backs. Moreover, we found 
that even though most of our respondents scored very 
high on privacy concerns, they still systematically 
differed in the effectiveness of their privacy protection 
behaviors: those who had highest privacy concerns also 
had fewer companies sending their data on outside 
Facebook activities to Facebook. 
Our second goal was to see who, in the mind of our 
respondents, should be the main actor responsible for 
securing privacy for users and which actor is the most 
capable of doing it. One surprising result was that 
public administration was not perceived as an actor 
sufficiently capable of ensuring institutional privacy. 
Our respondents were under no illusion that legal 
solutions, for example related to GDPR, could protect 
their privacy in a meaningful way. Our respondents 
also indicated that individual users were as much 
responsible for protecting privacy as online platforms, 
even if they felt that the agency of individuals in 
protecting privacy was much lower than that of social 
platforms. Thus, they seemed to be aware of the 
imbalances of control over data. They also seem to be 
aware of disproportions between the risks and gains of 
data gathering that they and business actors experience. 
In the eyes of our respondents benefits are much higher 
than risks on side of business actors, while risks  
exceed the gains on the side of individual users.  
We also wanted to verify if the sense of agency in 
privacy protection can be stimulated among internet 
users when they are confronted with information on 
how much data is being collected on their. We found 
that the overwhelming majority of our respondents 
expressed negative emotions - such as shock, disgust or 
fear - when confronted with the scope of data 
accumulation on social media. 
In the course of our study, we could also observe 
some signs of increased individuals’ awareness 
concerning the scope of data gathering and use by 
other commercial actors, which may increase their 
agency in privacy protection: e.g. an interest in 
updating privacy settings and tools for increased 
privacy protection as a result of our exercise, as 
expressed in open questions in the survey.  
5. Limitations  
Our study was carried out on a small, convenience 
sample of Facebook users and while it may have 
satisfactory ecological validity it also suffers from 
several limitations. First, the studied sample consisted 
of self-selected individuals who were sufficiently 
interested in privacy issues to click on the post 
promoting the study. This bias is reflected in the 
measures of privacy attitude included in the survey: all 
are skewed towards high privacy concerns. To 
investigate privacy behaviors and attitudes more 
comprehensively – and the discrepancy between them 
– studies employing representative sample collection 
would be beneficial. 
Second, there was a high attrition rate with only 
61% participants completing the survey, and only 31% 
completing the additional task that required accessing 
Facebook privacy settings. This might have 
exacerbated the self-selection bias for those of the 
analyses presented in the paper that tackled the issue of 
increasing awareness of data gathering and of the 
resulting changes in perception of such practices. 
Again, a good strategy for carrying out such 
procedures in the future is to ensure a more 
representative sample, with a wider range of privacy 
attitudes. Moreover, the difficulties involved in guiding 
users towards specific – often hidden – privacy 
features could be mitigated by using a face-to-face 
study design (e.g. CAPI) that would include assistance 
from the interviewer.  
Our sample was also limited to Facebook users 
speaking Polish and thus generalization of the results 
to other countries, cultures or regulatory contexts 
would be farfetched. However it is worth noting that 
similar results on users perceptions of the categories 
Facebook ascribes to its users were already reported 
for the US population [14]. 
Finally, it must be noted that the bias in the sample 
might have been aggravated by one additional, 
unforeseen factor: after nine days of promoting the 
study on Facebook, the promoting post was banned by 
the platform and the account that was used to post it 
was indefinitely blocked from the possibility to 
advertise posts. Thus, data gathering was prematurely 
halted, resulting in sample size below the desired level. 
Appealing the ban did not yield any results and the 
justification given did not provide any specific policy 
breaches. Thus, we are left to presume that the topic of 
the study together with the privacy settings task raised 
the privacy options awareness of study respondents to 
levels that the company did not feel comfortable with. 
The fact that such a simple procedure might be 
considered endangering by data gatherers serves as a 
case in point that raising social media users’ privacy 
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awareness can help mitigate the imbalances in control 
over data in digitalizing societies.  
6. Discussion and conclusions 
The imbalance of power stemming from the big 
tech capacity to gather and analyze data is growing, 
which means that the extent of privacy invasion risks 
increases and should be closely monitored. The main 
challenge is that personal data – closely related to the 
privacy of the data providers – becomes a commodity 
that can be traded [25]. Commodification of privacy 
goes against the assumption that, similarly to other 
human rights, the right to privacy is inalienable and 
non-negotiable [26]. As such, it should be key in 
developing not only better commercial platforms and 
services, but also human-centered smart policies [27]. 
Privacy requires that individuals have an area of 
autonomous presence and action, free from external 
intervention and control. The right to privacy means 
that individuals have the ability to determine who may 
have information about them and how that information 
is to be used [28]. This implies awareness and agency 
of users, as well as clear definition of responsibilities 
assigned to private and public institutions involved in 
data collection and its further processing. 
However, in the reality of data-driven economy and 
smart policy-making, commodification of digital 
identities does not go hand in hand with increased 
awareness and agency of data subjects. To the 
contrary, data collection mechanisms are designed to 
maximize data sharing and therefore benefit the system 
providers at the cost of users’ privacy. While users 
may be aware of the “imbalance of benefits” that their 
data sharing involves, they often remain reluctant to 
change their online behaviors.  
One of the reasons may be that the exchange of 
personal data via digital means is perceived a 
“conscious compromise”, in which users voluntarily 
surrender private information in return for digital 
access to specific information, goods and services [28]. 
This approach assumes that users can always refuse to 
share data and forego the use of digital platforms. 
However, in the context of modern technological 
dependency, such “logging out” [29] would mean 
foregoing important services and interactions, which is 
not a viable option for the majority of users. 
In the era of Big Data, which is dominated by data-
driven economy, the awareness of users is a core 
element in balancing between technological innovation 
and individuals’ rights. Existing passive defense 
mechanisms of privacy and personal data protection 
seem to be both unrealistic and ineffective. A more 
realistic and effective approach towards protection of 
users’ needs to involve an active empowerment of 
individuals in their personal data management [26]. 
This could be done through addressing privacy paradox 
at its core – and creating an easy alternative to the 
“resigned pragmatism” [16].  
As our study shows, creating awareness is a first 
step in this process, as individuals do not seem to be 
fully alert about the amount of data sharing, as well as 
its potential commercial value, and tend to 
underestimate their ability to control their digital 
identity [26]. Instead they enter an unequal exchange in 
which their data becomes a currency to pay for “free” 
digital services or discounts for online products and 
services. Most users seem to not realize that at the 
moment of this exchange both the user data and 
profiling algorithms are turning into a legally protected 
private business asset. At the same time, respondents in 
our study with high level of privacy concern proved to 
be able to protect their institutional privacy.  
One approach to counteract this process is to 
expand the control that people have over their digital 
data at the individual level. Another one is a collective 
control approach in which the collective power of data 
subjects can be exercised over data commons [29]. 
While our ambition was not to find a perfect solution, 
we hoped to shed some light on the users’ perception 
of risks and the perceived agency of actors involved in 
the data cycle. 
Meanwhile, the EU and other international bodies 
discuss different ways of protecting privacy without 
seriously hindering the digital economy and smart 
policies implementation. The EU GDPR's primary aim 
was to give individuals control over their personal 
data: ensuring that the end-users’ consent will be freely 
given, specific, informed and active. However, as we 
tried to illustrate here, this approach has serious 
limitations on the individual level: people simply do 
not perceive government as the most capable agent 
when it comes to industrial  privacy protection. 
In this context, further studies concerning privacy-
related behaviors and data collection patterns are 
crucial to ensure that the users’ digital rights are 
respected and their agency is effectively strengthened. 
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